11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) 1 ORS 20.096 2 Attorneys Fees 3 Adv. #97-3479 Advanta National Bank, USA v. Main Case #397-35087-rld7 Meneley (In re Meneley) 5 6/9/98 RLD Unpublished 6 Bank requested reconsideration of denial of its attorneys fees asserting that the Supreme Court recently recognized a right to recover, among other things, attorneys fees as a "debt" in an action brought under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 The court denied the motion for reconsideration, S.Ct. 1212 (1998). finding that the sole basis for claiming attorneys fees in this case was the Bank's contractual provision enforceable pursuant to ORS Because the issues tried related to fraud for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A) rather than any contract cause of action, the contractual provision was unavailing to the Bank. The court determined that American Express Travel Related Services Company Inc. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 12 1997) was not inconsistent with Cohen and remained the controlling authority in cases such as this where there is no statutory 13 authorization to award attorneys fees to the Bank as the prevailing party on its fraud claim under § 523(a)(2)(A). 14 P98-2(3)15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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                        UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
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                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
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    In Re:
                                          Bankruptcy Case
                                          No. 397-35087-rld7
   RODNEY D. MENELEY
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                                          Adversary Proceeding
    and BREEON B. MENELEY,
                                          No. 97 - 3\overline{4}79
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                         Debtors.
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                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
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   ADVANTA NATIONAL BANK, USA,
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                         Plaintiff,
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           v.
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   RODNEY D. MENELEY,
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                         Defendant.
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           Following a trial on the complaint in this adversary
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    proceeding, I issued a letter opinion finding that debtor Rodney
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   Meneley's debt to Advanta National Bank, USA (the "Bank") was
   nondischargeable. Letter Opinion, dated April 28, 1998. Relying on
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   American Express Travel Related Services Company Inc. v. Hashemi (In
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    re Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1997), I denied the
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   Bank's request for attorneys fees pursuant to its Cardholder
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Agreement because I did not need to determine the enforceability of the Cardholder Agreement in order to determine dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The Bank timely moved for reconsideration of the denial of its attorneys fees, asserting that Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (1998), decided by the United States Supreme Court on March 24, 1998, recognized a right to recover attorneys fees for the prosecution of a fraud action under § 523(a)(2)(A).

I have reviewed the memoranda of the parties filed in connection with the motion for reconsideration. I find the <u>Cohen</u> decision distinguishable from the facts before me. In <u>Cohen</u>, the creditor was entitled to recover treble damages and attorneys fees as a "debt" pursuant to the provisions of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Supreme Court did not find any right to an award of attorneys fees under § 523(a)(2)(A) itself.

In the instant case, the Bank is relying on a contract provision, enforceable pursuant to ORS 20.096, authorizing an award of attorneys fees in connection with collecting amounts due under the Cardholder Agreement. Because Mr. Meneley did not contest the allegation that he had breached his Cardholder Agreement with the Bank, the issues that were tried before me were those relating solely to Mr. Meneley's alleged fraud for purposes of \$ 523(a)(2)(A), rather than to any contract causes of action. In these circumstances, I am bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hashemi, which is not inconsistent with Cohen, to the effect that there is no statutory authorization to award attorneys fees to the

Bank as the prevailing party on its fraud cause of action under § 523(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, I must deny the Bank's motion for reconsideration.

The foregoing constitutes my findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. I will enter a separate order denying the Bank's motion.

RANDALL L. DUNN

Bankruptcy Judge

Thomas K. Wolf cc: Dale F. Evans John W. Lundeen